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The first and most important advice that I can give to my successors and people to make Afghanistan into a great kingdom is to impress upon their minds the value of unity; unity, and unity alone, can make it into a great power.
-Abdur Rahman Khan Amir of Afghanistan (1880 Afghanistan ( -1901 Considered by western scholars as the "founder of modern Afghanistan"
There are several areas of concern that inhibit the security and stability of the developing nation of Afghanistan. National caveats hinder the unity of effort and unity of command with three different commanders at the theater-level of operations. The command and control of operations suffer from a lack of interoperability at all levels and systems, to include usage of liaison officers. Burden sharing among participating NATO members is a matter of gamesmanship. On one hand, participating nations strive to demonstrate their contributions to appease fellow members, but do so only to benefit self-interest and not necessarily the best interest of NATO or Afghanistan.
Afghanistan risks sliding into a failed state and becoming the "forgotten war" due to deteriorating international support and the growing violence of the insurgency, according to an independent study conducted by The Center for the Study of the Presidency, Afghanistan Study Group Report. 1 Despite comprehensive acknowledgement that Afghanistan represents a test for future viability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Alliance strategy continues to suffer from a number of deficiencies, which need addressing if the enterprise in Afghanistan is to succeed. After six years, the challenging mission is testing the resources, although not yet the will, of the members of NATO. 2 For example, the Atlantic Council of the United
States stated "NATO is not winning in Afghanistan" and recommends prompt changes in course, including a coherent security and reconstruction assessment, appointment of a UN high commissioner, and the establishment of a comprehensive regional strategy, to include neighboring actors like Pakistan and Iran.
3 National Caveats Hinder Unity of Effort and Unity of Command
Member nation governments must allow the Senior National Representative (SNR) and ISAF commander to represent forces in theater and bring resources to bear in order to remain committed to operations sanctioned by NATO. Nations who agree to contribute forces to the coalition must minimize or remove national caveats so not to impinge on campaign design and the specifics of tactical level operations. National caveats are "restrictions some countries place on how NATO can use their forces." 4 Commanders or the SNR must seek approval from their government for specific operations if mission criteria designate the risk as a caveat by the government. The current environment allows little time to review operations to ensure nations participating do not have restrictions from national caveats in effect.
A recommendation by United States Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates urged
European governments to increase their countries' contributions in Afghanistan and eliminate restrictions on their forces that are a threat to mission success. 5 Along with
Secretary Gates, NATO Ambassador Nicolas Burns also believes NATO needs a larger force and one that is less encumbered by restrictions on the troops. 6 Restrictions placed on troops and where they operate, impede progress in the ISAF campaign.
National caveats force the NATO-International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)
Commander and subordinate commanders to defer critical decisions even at the tactical and operational levels until nations involved in the operation are agreeable, and their governments have approved their participation in the operation. 7 These caveats continue to hinder progress by ISAF when plans must change to accommodate restrictions. They also prevent the commander from deploying forces where necessary to make a greater impact on the situation. Minimizing or lifting caveats allows the ISAF commander's staff to plan in coordination with a region to maximize resources for successful execution of operations. Nations participating in the ISAF mission must accept a certain level of risk to allow forces flexibility to operate where necessary without constraints.
Use of Bureaucracy to Circumvent Compliance of Command Directives
The principal policy and decision-making body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 8 The NAC meets weekly to resolve policy issues or to make decisions on behalf of all NATO members. The council is a medium for nations to confer about issues among governments. Some nations avoid adhering to written directives from ISAF that place their forces in questionable situations and maintain the right to make their own decision. They take the path of least resistance and go directly to their nation for a decision. Typically, the issue is brought to the NAC, and a decision is made without consultation of ISAF headquarters. Allowing nations to circumvent or amend directives for their purpose by using this process places precedence for testing the validity of the alliance.
Rules of engagement and directives established by NATO, in concurrence with SNR's from each nation, need to remain consistent for every element operating in theater under the NATO flag. Nations place SNRs in theater to represent their country's interests, but often SNRs are bound to seek a secondary approval through their government channels, nullifying unity of command and ISAF authority in theater.
Resourcing, usage of aircraft, transportation, and logistical resupply likewise require consistency among NATO partners. There are nations who use their government and bureaucracy to thwart directives or initial validations. 9 Allowing nations to challenge situations with which they disagree questions validity and loyalty to ISAF and the alliance.
National Preferences Regarding Force Contributions Often Conflict with Needs
National "preferences" create operational constraints and tie the hands of the ISAF commander excessively. In addition, they affect the operational boundaries, which need to remain linked to the Afghan National Army operational boundaries, instead of changing every time a national caveat is in question, and a NATO nation wants to alter the boundaries to serve its own self-interest. For example, all NATO forces should rotate for duty to regional command (RC) south and not just as a force provider to one location where the risk is less, where domestic will prevails, and dollar expenditures are less of a burden on the overall expenses of a nation. Many nations have agreed to participate in the ISAF operation, but only if they can work as lead nation in one area of the country or as a specific regional coalition. ISAF, as a security provider, will not succeed unless nations are willing to accept risk in allowing the ISAF commander flexibility to allocate forces where they will bring success overall to the operation in theater. The NATO Alliance needs to be more unified in the percentage of force contribution, not just a few nations providing the bulk of dollars, aircraft, and military forces. As reported in The Economist, the Western Alliance is in question as to how long it will be able to survive. 10 Nations want to assist, but domestic will constrains contingent deployment to a year or less at a time. With the lack of long-term commitment and specific regional preferences by other nations, U.S. force contributions will continue to remain in effect or increase to fill gaps.
The risk is too high to say there is no longer a U.S. force requirement in theater.
Particularly when other nations attend NAC meetings and set forth threats to withdraw their forces due to souring political opinion and questioning the validity of the mission or the direction of the campaign. Although there is 43,250 plus troops in Afghanistan, the national preferences and caveats excessively restrict the ISAF commander from using the forces where they will benefit progress in the tactical and operational levels of the campaign. 11 Additionally, only eight out of twenty-six NATO member nations are providing the vast majority of troops in Afghanistan. 12 With only thirty percent of the nations contributing, it undercuts the concept of multinational efforts and demonstrates that NATO is not functioning as a collective will of member governments. 13 Another issue related to force contributions is the need for additional troop transport, logistics, and inadequate defense spending by Alliance members. ISAF is NATO's first mission outside Europe and its purpose is to demonstrate NATO's new raison d'être while the Afghans establish security, rule of law, and a representative government. 15 As Ambassador Nicolas Burns recently observed, "We know that this is the first ground operation in the 59-year history of NATO. It is absolutely essential that NATO succeed." 16 In order for the Afghan government to be successful, the NATO alliance must stay committed and members of the alliance need to assist each other. 17 Some severe critics claim that NATO has already lost the war, and achieving success is doubtful since many allies are unwilling to share risks, commit resources, and follow through on commitments to the mission and to each other. concentrated effort to reward sectors that achieve secure areas, and can bring governance, economic stability, money, and infrastructure to the local population.
In addition, there is a difference in philosophy over the use of kinetic or non-kinetic instruments to execute a mission. Most European nations support improvement efforts through reconstruction, development, and regional basing, but do not endorse crossboundary, combat operations or kinetic effects to achieve a desired end-state. A limited number of nations contribute ground forces but do not allow them to move to other regions to support combat operations but use them as regional security elements.
Others believe non-kinetic means will bring security by negotiating with the insurgents and agreeing to work together to provide security and stability for the local population, but this approach does not last and tends to undermine the campaign plan. As OMLTs began deploying into theater, there were feasible areas inside the U.S.
section of the Afghan camps that could accommodate an OMLT, but due to security restrictions, the forces cannot co-locate.
Regional operations suffer when dissension between nations occurs, and the regional commanders stipulate that ISAF directives must comply with national interests 
Physical Separation of Command Elements Severely Restrict Planning, Coordination, and Harmonization of Efforts
Operations occur in a decentralized manner and each ISAF regional commander plans operations, determines his desired end state, and submits the plan to the ISAF planning staff. Lastly, the ANSF become integrated and briefed on how the operation will proceed. In most cases, as personally observed, the ISAF regional command staff waits until the last minute to include the Afghan corps commander or subordinate elements in the planning process. 22 Current philosophy is to wait until within hours of an operation. The international forces do not trust the ANSF and are apprehensive of compromising the operation. Executing missions in this manner will never develop the ANSF and impedes the progress of the government at both the regional and national level.
Planning operations at a face-to-face meeting is complex due to physical distance and separation between commands and their subordinate elements. At the same time, phone networks and video conferences had not advanced enough for planning to occur remotely. Thus, each region provides a liaison officer (LNO) to its parent headquarters.
The role of this officer is to assist in the planning of combat operations and to monitor reconstruction and stability operations in accordance with timelines and in synchronization with the direction of the ADZ's. Although the LNOs work with the higher headquarters, they often reside in the region they represent, thus causing difficulty when flights were cancelled due to weather or down time for aircraft maintenance.
Planning frequently occurs at ISAF Headquarters without LNO participation due to high absenteeism. Additionally, regional force protection measures further limit the ability of LNOs to make meetings. As a result ISAF planning and synchronization lacks 
The Politics of Burden Sharing
Burden sharing and military spending are a recurrent and interconnected source of strain within the Atlantic Alliance and with the political system of its members. 25 As defined by Dr. Wallace Thies, "Burden shifting is the art of manipulating alliance relationships for political gain." 26 In other words, NATO member states seek to minimize their obligations while trying to make other allies carry a heavier burden. NATO members need to work together to share assets and assist each other in common interests. All parties will benefit from sharing the burden and distributing the requirements equally. NATO countries need to be willing to assist each other with areas of each individual country's strengths, so that the duration of commitment of effort continues and provides for enduring operations without strain on any one nation.
Burden Sharing to Keep Defense Spending Down
Burden sharing among NATO, forces to keep defense spending down and to avoid domestic political contention is the appropriate path forward in Afghanistan. As logical as this sounds, smaller alliance members shrink their contributions. Thies observes, "There is repeated evidence of a strong relationship between member size and share of Gross National Profit (GNP) spent on defense, which is interpreted as disproportionate in burden-sharing, also known as exploitation of the great and small." 27 NATO needs to change this behavior. National security is not the only measurement of defense terms.
Security itself is not merely a military notion and burden sharing is not measured simply in terms of defense. Resources for national military establishments become insufficient as political leaders resolve conflicting demands for homeland defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and health, education, environmental protection, tax reductions and other competing demands on state finances that the public demands. 28 The underlying issue with the thought of alliance division of labor, is that allies who compete to shift burdens to one another are unlikely to agree on what is a more reasonable, much less a favorable distribution of roles and missions, to include justifying the way burden is shared by redistribution from one member to another.
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Hence, the NAC should set force and resource contributions during the planning process and adjust them as the situation changes. The NAC cannot avoid this responsibility.
Public Pronouncements of Contributions but Lack Follow-through with Obligations
NATO controls operations in Afghanistan, but members lack a long-term commitment due to domestic pressures to leave Afghanistan. Ironically, all alliance members initially stated they were committed to Afghanistan for long-term, despite disagreement on how the burden is shared. 30 Although NATO has committed to the mission, it is apparent members are not fully committed in burden-sharing and resourcing the operations. As missions and tasks have increased over time and along with them, higher risk, members have begun to balk.
An unbalanced commitment among coalition members and associated operational constraints has undermined the multinational effort to wage a successful counterinsurgency and state building. the alliance only has 20,000 besides those forces provided by Britain, Canada, and the United States." 36 European domestic opinion has a limited desire for sending fellow citizens to pursue insurgents in other areas of the world; they reflect the will of their people. 37 The issue at hand is not so much the failure of NATO in Afghanistan; rather, it is the effect failure will have on the raison d'être of NATO.
Conclusion
It is hard to visualize how NATO can succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan without an alliance willing to commit more troops, provide more resources, and allow commanders more flexibility. The governments in Europe and the US focus on short-term budget problems, but in the long-term, providing greater resources now to Afghanistan could potentially save funds later. 38 During an earlier meeting of NATO defense ministers in Riga, Latvia on 28 and 29 November 2006 divisions surfaced among those nations who felt they were bearing too much of the fighting--mainly US, Canada, Britain, and the Netherland--versus those members with either excessive national caveats on their troops' location or their ability to participate in combat missions, namely Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. 39 It does not appear that any resolution to these deficiencies will be noted at the next NATO summit. One wonders, why have summits then?
In remarks to CNN, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said he is aware, according to the NATO commander, that other countries are prepared to contribute more. In addition, there are means by which burden sharing can occur but the military effort must be complimented by diplomatic efforts and development work that has been completed. 40 Although there is a great desire to bring Afghanistan stable governance, regional stability, and security for the people, there remains a great amount of work to do now before the insurgency strengthens and progress is lost.
It is debatable whether the insurgency is growing stronger in the south, but it is undebateable that NATO does not have sufficient commitment from members to ensure success. The countries contributing have experienced forces, yet domestic pressure prevails in limiting contributions of forces and resources. One nation cannot win the war, but integrated as one force, maximizing resources, NATO can bring progress to
Afghanistan. Essential to this is the lifting of national caveats for both force contributions and country assets needed to achieve the overall strategy in theater.
Thoughtful consideration is necessary to bring unity of command and unity of effort by all nations, not just European countries. Harmonized communications at all levels are essential if coalition members are to operate in a coordinated manner. Synchronization from the lowest level to the highest must incorporate both Afghans and coalition their partners not only for the operational success, but also to teach the Afghans the benefits of cooperation.
NATO must reflect a true alliance, not just the "Coalition of the willing." The message must be that NATO will not rest until Afghanistan has security, governance, peace, and stabilization. Every contributing nation must consider the consequences of failure in Afghanistan not just to the Afghans, but also to the future of NATO. Failure can cause the Alliance to crumble.
Every element of national power from NATO needs implementing for success to occur. After six years of war progress continues, but at a slow pace. The conflict is not just a Taliban one but a drug war with opium production at a faster rate than before the war began. Success in Afghanistan not only requires military precision, but also economic revival and reconstruction of key infrastructure.
41
Afghanistan is making diplomatic, economic, and military progress, although not as fast as expectations. Financially, the country continually grows and children attend schools built by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and NATO. The approach towards success must come in the form of more burden sharing by all thirty-seven nations involved, not just three major nations alongside the ANSF fighting intense battles in the east and south of the country. In order for Afghanistan to reverse the negative trends, a comprehensive and realistic appraisal of the situation needs conducting to include creation of a strategic action plan addressing short and long-term security challenges. 42 Expanding commitment of the international community to Afghanistan's future will assist the emerging Afghan government and diminish alQaida's appeal to people in Central and South Asia. 43 NATO must resolve the issues of a unified command strategy, caveats, burden sharing, and capability shortfalls in order to continue a lasting commitment in Afghanistan.
Recommendations:
• Minimize or do away with caveats that restrict the commander's ability to prosecute an operation.
• Minimize the number of Combatant commands involved in managing the command and control of the mission.
• Standardize the timing and length of rotations for predictability and relationship building.
• Fund a communications network that is standard for the entire theater of operations.
• Ensure nations are providing their share of resources as a NATO member Endnotes
